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Abstract
This paper provides some of the ﬁrst evidence that rural development policies can
have fundamental eﬀects on the reallocation of labor between rural and urban areas.
It studies the spillover eﬀects of the world's largest rural workfare program, India's
rural employment guarantee. We ﬁnd that the workfare program has substantial con-
sequences: it reduces short-term (or seasonal) migration to urban areas by 9% and
increases wages for manual, short-term work in urban areas by 6%. The implied elas-
ticity of unskilled wages with respect to short-term migration is high (-0.7).
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1 Introduction
Since rural and labor markets are linked through migration ﬂows, rural development policies
may have spillover eﬀects on urban areas by aﬀecting the reallocation of labor between
rural and urban areas (Harris and Todaro, 1970; Fields, 2005). The existence of these
spillovers is an open empirical question, which is challenging for at least two reasons. First,
rural development policies may aﬀect urban areas in diﬀerent ways, e.g. through changes in
migration, consumption or investment.1 Precisely identifying migration spillovers is diﬃcult,
unless migration networks are geographically distinct from production and trade linkages.
Second, rural to urban migration ﬂows include not only long-term migrants, who leave the
village to settle down in the cities, but also short-term (or seasonal) migrants, who still live
in the village and spend part of the year working in the cities. Short-term migration is
diﬃcult to measure without dedicated survey data, and it has so far received little attention
in economics.2 In countries where data is available, short-term ﬂows seem to play a major role
in labor reallocation between rural and urban areas: in 2007 an estimated 8.1 million rural
Indian adults undertook trips of one to six months to work in urban areas. By comparison,
in the same year net rural to urban long-term migration was about 2 million, and 14 million
urban adults did casual (unskilled) wage work.3
In this paper, we study the eﬀect of India's National Rural Employment Guarantee Act
(NREGA) on migration from rural areas to urban areas, and its consequences for urban labor
markets. The NREGA is well-suited for the purpose of studying rural to urban spill-overs.
It is a workfare program, which hires rural adults on public works during the agricultural
oﬀ-season with the goal of increasing the income of the poor.4 It is a large program, with
close to 50 million household participants in 20135, which had signiﬁcant impacts on rural
labor markets (Imbert and Papp, 2015). In order to evaluate its eﬀect on rural to urban
migration, and urban labor markets we combine a novel dataset from a high out-migration
area collected by the Research Institute for Compassionate Economics (herafter RICE Coﬀey
et al. (2015)) with data from the nationally representative National Sample Survey (hereafter
NSS). Our identiﬁcation strategy relies on variation in NREGS implementation across India.
1Agricultural productivity has been found to have local spillover eﬀects on the non-agricultural sector
through these three channels (Marden, 2015; Colmer, 2016; Santangelo, 2016).
2See Banerjee and Duﬂo (2007); Badiani and Saﬁr (2009); Morten (2012); Bryan et al. (2014).
3Authors' calculations based on the NSS Employment-Unemployment Survey (July 2007 to June 2008).
4Workfare programs are common antipoverty policies. Recent examples include programs in Malawi,
Bangladesh, India, Philippines, Zambia, Ethiopia, Sri Lanka, Chile, Uganda, and Tanzania.
5Oﬃcial reports available at http://nrega.nic.in.
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The scheme was rolled out across Indian districts in phases, with 330 early districts selected
to implement the scheme ﬁrst, and the remaining rural districts implementing it in April
2008. It was also unevenly implemented across states, with seven star states providing
most of the public employment.
We evaluate the impact of the NREGA on short-term migration using two empirical
strategies. First, we use RICE survey data from 70 villages located in a high out-migration
area and matched across two state borders and compare NREGA work and migration across
states and seasons. We ﬁnd that adults living in one state that provided more days of gov-
ernment work spend less time outside the village for work compared with the two other other
states: one additional day of public employment reduces short-term migration by 0.6 days.
Reassuringly, this cross-state diﬀerence in days spent outside the village for work is present
only during the summer months when most of the government work is provided. Second, we
use nationally representative data from NSS and compare districts selected to implement the
NREGA in states which actively implemented the scheme (early disticts of star states),
with other rural districts. We ﬁnd no diﬀerence in public employment or migration in 1999,
before the NREGA was implemented. Between 1999 and 2007, public employement increased
and short-term migration decreased in districts where the program was implemented. Our
estimates suggest that short-term migration ﬂows across India decreased by up to 9%.
We next consider the impact of the NREGA on urban labor markets. A calibration
exercise reveals that a 1% drop in the inﬂow of short-term migrants may increase wages for
manual, short-term work in urban areas by as much as 0.7%. We investigate this prediction
empirically using data on long and short-term migration ﬂows and a gravity model which
predicts for each urban area the inﬂow of migrants coming from rural areas with and without
the NREGA. We ﬁnd that unskilled wages increased in urban labor markets with higher
migration rates from rural areas where the NREGA is implemented. The increase in wages
is 6% across urban India, which is consistent with the calibration. By contrast, urban
centers with higher migration rates from rural areas where the NREGA is not implemented
experienced lower wage growth. Urban wage growth does not depend on the origin of rural
short-term migrants before the program was implemented or after the program was rolled
out in all rural districts, which suggests that our results are not driven by long run trends
unrelated to the program. Finally, the urban wage eﬀects are not concentrated in districts
or states which implemented the NREGA. This ﬁnding alleviates the concern that NREGA
implementation would be endogenous to urban outcomes. It also suggests that our results
are driven by changes in migration, rather than local demand or investment.
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This paper contributes to the literature in three ways. First, we present evidence that
workfare programs can have important eﬀects on labor markets beyond their direct impact
on beneﬁciaries. The literature on labor market impacts of workfare programs is mostly
theoretical (Ravallion, 1987; Basu et al., 2009). Recent empirical studies focus on the impact
of workfare programs on rural labor markets (Azam, 2012; Berg et al., 2013; Imbert and Papp,
2015; Zimmermann, 2013). Other studies have suggested that workfare programs may reduce
short-term migration from rural areas (Jacob, 2008; Ashish and Bhatia, 2009; Morten, 2012;
Das, ming). This study is the ﬁrst to provide direct evidence that through their eﬀect on
short-term migration, rural public works have signiﬁcant impacts on urban labor markets.
Second, we present evidence that a commonly used anti-poverty policy signiﬁcantly af-
fects the extent of labor reallocation towards the urban non-agricultural sector. The recent
literature on structural transformation identiﬁes the lack of labor mobility as an important
obstacle to development (Gollin and Rogerson, 2014; Morten and Oliveira, 2014; Munshi
and Rosenzweig, 2016). Some studies have also suggested that there is scope for policies
to reduce poverty and promote economic development by encouraging migration (Jalan and
Ravallion, 2002; Bryan et al., 2014; Kraay and McKenzie, 2014). Angelucci (2013) ﬁnds that
by relaxing credit constraints a cash-transfer increases migration from Mexico to the US. In
contrast, our results suggest that workfare programs which provide public employment in
rural areas may reduce migration by increasing the opportunity cost of leaving the village.
Third, we estimate the labor market eﬀects of short-term (or seasonal) migration ﬂows.
The migration literature traditionally focuses on estimating the impact of inﬂows of inter-
national migrants on local labor markets (Card, 1990, 2001; Friedberg, 2001; Borjas, 2003).
Recent studies have investigated the impact of changes in migration within countries fol-
lowing a productivity shock or an initial inﬂow of international migrants (Kleemans and
Magruder, 2014; Badaoui et al., 2014; Monras, 2014). Closer to our study, Boustan et al.
(2010) estimate the impact of the generosity of New Deal programs on migration, wages
and employment in US cities during the Great Depression. Our contribution is to show that
short-term, seasonal movements of labor are reactive to policy changes and may have large
impacts on urban labor markets.
The following section describes the workfare program and presents the data set used
throughout the paper. Section 3 uses cross-state variation in public employment provision
to estimate the impact of the program on short-term migration. Section 4 uses nationally
representative data from NSS Surveys to estimate the impact of the program on urban labor
markets across India. Section 5 concludes.
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2 Context and data
In this section we describe employment provision under the National Rural Employment
Guarantee Act. We next present the two data sources we use in the empirical analysis.
2.1 The NREGA
India's National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), passed in September 2005,
entitles every household in rural India to 100 days of work per year at a state speciﬁc
minimum wage. The act was gradually introduced throughout India starting with 200 of the
poorest districts in February 2006, extending to 130 additional districts in April 2007, and
to the rest of rural India in April 2008. The assignment of districts to phases was partly
based on a backwardness index computed by the Planning Commission, using poverty rate,
agricultural productivity, agricultural wages and the share of tribal population as poverty
criteria (Planning Commission, 2003). In the analysis we will call "early districts" the
districts in which the scheme was implemented by April 2007 and late districts the rest of
rural India. Column One and Two in Table 1 present the main diﬀerences between early and
late districts. Early districts are indeed poorer than late districts, they have lower wages
and agricultural productivity, and a higher share of tribal population. As compared to late
districts, they have reduced access to education and medical facilities, banks, post oﬃces,
paved roads and electricity.
Available evidence suggests substantial variation in the implementation of the program
across states and even districts (Dreze and Khera, 2009; Dreze and Oldiges, 2009). Figure 1
shows the extent of cross-state variation in public works employment in 2004-05 (before the
NREGA) and 2007-08 (when the NREGA was implemented in phase one and two districts).
As in Imbert and Papp (2015) we use the term star states to describe seven states which
are responsible for most NREGA employment provision: in Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh,
Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Uttarkhand and Tamil Nadu. (Dutta et al.,
2012) argue that cross-states diﬀerences in NREGA implementation did not reﬂect underly-
ing demand for NREGA work. States such as Bihar or Uttar Pradesh, which have a large
population of rural poor have provided little NREGA employment.
Columns Four and Five in Table 1 present averages of socio-economic indicators in star
and non-star states.6 According to these indicators, star states do not seem to be system-
atically richer nor poorer than other states. Poverty rates are slightly lower in star states,
6Appendix A details how we construct these indicators.
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the literacy rate and the fraction of scheduled castes are the same, the proportions of sched-
uled tribes are higher. Star states have a larger fraction of the labor force in agriculture,
but the agricultural productivity per worker and the wage for casual labor in agriculture
are the same. They have lower population density, which translates into larger amounts of
cultivable land per capita, both irrigated and non irrigated. Finally, they have better access
to electricity (according to 2001 census data), and spent more per capita under the national
rural road program and under national watershed programmes in 2007-08, which suggests
that they are more eﬀective in implementing public infrastructure programs.
An important question is whether diﬀerences in economic conditions or quality of gov-
ernance can explain diﬀerences in public employment provision under the NREGA between
star and non-star states. Figure 2 plots for each state the average residual from a regression
of the fraction of time spent on public works by each prime age adults on the whole list
of district characteristics presented in Table 1 as well as worker controls.7 The ranking of
states in terms of employment provision remains strikingly similar to Figure 1. This provides
support to the idea that diﬀerences in NREGA implementation are not mainly driven by
diﬀerences in economic conditions or governance quality, but by some combination of politi-
cal will, existing administrative capacity, and previous experience in providing public works
(Dutta et al., 2012).8
Public employment provision is also highly seasonal. Local governments start and stop
works throughout the year, with most works concentrated during the ﬁrst two quarters of
the year prior to the monsoon. The monsoon rains make construction projects diﬃcult
to undertake, which is likely part of the justiﬁcation. Field reports, however, document
government attempts to keep work-sites closed throughout the fall so they do not compete
with the labor needs of farmers (Association for Indian Development, 2009). According to
the National Sample Survey 2007-08, the average number of days spent on public works per
adult was above one day during the ﬁrst and second quarter of the year (January to June),
and about a quarter of a day during the third and fourth quarter (July to December).
Work under the act is short-term, often on the order of a few weeks per adult. In our
own survey described below, households with at least one member employed under the act
7Worker controls include dummy variables for gender, age group, religion, caste, education level and
marital status.
8For example, in the Congress ruled Andhra Pradesh the NREGA was well implemented while in Gujarat
the BJP government refused to implement what it viewed as a Congress policy. In Rajasthan the BJP
government adopted the NREGA as part of the state's long tradition of drought relief. In Maharashtra the
scheme was not implemented, because it was perceived as a repetition of the state's Employment Guarantee
Scheme launched in the 1970s, which (Ravallion et al., 1991).
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during agricultural year 2009-10 report a mean of only 38 days of work and a median of 30
days for all members of the household during that year, which is well below the guaranteed
100 days. Within the study area as well as throughout India, work under the program is
rationed. During agricultural year 2009-10, 45% of Indian households wanted work under
the act but only 25% of Indian households beneﬁted from the program.9 The rationing rule
is at the discretion of local oﬃcials: a World Bank report notes that workers tend to wait
passively to be recruited rather than actively applying for work (The World Bank, 2011).
2.2 Nationally representative data (NSS)
The main obstacle to studying migration is the scarcity of reliable data. The migration
literature traditionally focuses on long-term migrants, who appear in population censuses.
Studying short-term migration is more challenging, as it requires dedicated data collection
eﬀorts, which are often targeted to particular rural areas known to have high levels of seasonal
migration (Bryan et al., 2014). In this study we combine two data sources, the nationally
representative NSS survey and an original survey from 70 villages located in a high out-
migration area.10
Our primary source of information is the Employment and Unemployment Survey carried
out by the National Sample Survey Organisation (here on, NSS Employment Survey).
The NSS Employment Survey is a nationally representative household survey conducted
at irregular intervals which collects information on employment and wages in urban and
rural areas, with one specialized module whose focus changes from round to round. For the
purpose of our analysis, we use the 1999-00, 2004-05, 2007-08 and 2011-12 rounds, of which
only the 1999-00 and 2007-08 rounds include questions on the migration history of each
household member. For the 2007-08 round, we only consider the ﬁrst three quarters of the
survey year (July 2007 to March 2008), before the roll-out of the program to late districts
on the 1st April 2008.
Our analysis with NSS data focuses on district level outcomes.11 The NSS Employment
survey sample is stratiﬁed by urban and rural areas of each district. Our sample includes
districts within the twenty largest states of India, excluding Jammu and Kashmir. We
9Author's calculations based on NSS Employment-Unemployment Survey (June 2009-July 2010).
10To our knowledge, no comparable data exists for India as a whole. ARIS REDS data for the year 2006
does contain information on seasonal migration, but no information on job search, work found or living
conditions at destination.
11 Districts are administrative units within states. The median district in our sample had a rural population
of 1.37 million in 2008 and an area of 1600 square miles.
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exclude Jammu and Kashmir since survey data is missing for some quarters due to conﬂicts
in the area. The remaining 497 districts represent 97.4% of the population of India. The
NSSO over-samples some types of households and therefore provides sampling weights (see
National Sample Survey Organisation (2008) for more details). All statistics and estimates
computed using the NSS data are adjusted using these sampling weights.12
2.2.1 Short-term migration
In order to measure short-term migration, we use NSS Employment surveys 1999-00 and
2007-08, which are the only two recent rounds that include a migration module. NSS 1999-
00 asks whether each household member has spent between two and six months away from the
village for work within the past year. NSS 2007-08 asks a slightly diﬀerent question, whether
each household member has spent between one and six months away from the village for
work within the past year. For this reason, one would expect 2007-08 data to report higher
levels of short-term migration than 1999-2000, even if migration has not actually changed
between the two periods. Indeed, the percentage of short-term migrants among rural prime
age adult is an estimated 1.67% in 1999-00 and 2.51% in 2007-08.13
For those who were away, NSS 2007-08 further records the number of trips, the destination
during the longest spell, and the industry in which they worked. The destination is coded
in seven categories: same district (rural or urban), other district in the same state (rural
or urban), another state (rural or urban), and another country. Figure 3 draws the map of
short-term migration across rural Indian districts. Short-term migration is not widespread,
with most districts having migration rates lower than 1%. It is highly concentrated in poorer
districts of the North-East (Bihar, Uttar Pradesh) and the West (Gujarat and Rajasthan),
which report migration rates above 5%.
2.2.2 Employment and wages
We further use NSS Employment Surveys to construct measures of employment and wages
at origin and destination. The NSS Employment Survey includes detailed questions about
the daily activities for all persons over the age of four in surveyed households for the most
recent seven days. We restrict the sample to persons aged 15 to 69. We then compute for
12See Appendix A for details on the construction of sample weights.
13Authors calculation based on NSS Employment Surveys 1999-00 and 2007-08. In the RICE survey
described below, we ﬁnd 32% of adults were away from one to six months in the last 12 months and 23%
were away for two to six months. This suggests that a statistical artifact may explain the whole diﬀerence
between 1999-00 and 2007-08 short-term migration levels measured by the NSS.
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each person the percentage of days in the past seven days spent in each of six mutually
exclusive activities: public works, casual wage work, salaried wage work, self-employment,
unemployement and out of the labor force. The NSSO makes the distinction between two
types of wage work depending on the duration and formality of the relationship with the
employer: salaried work is long-term and often involves a formal contract, and casual work
is temporary and informal. In our analysis, we will focus on casual work, which is the
dominant form of employment for short-term migrants from rural areas. We compute the
average earnings per day worked in casual labor (the casual wage) and in salaried work
(the salaried wage). Finally, in order to estimate the total number of workers engaged in
casual work in each district we use the NSSO question on the occupation of each household
member in the last year and categorize as casual worker every household member who
reports casual work as her principal or subsidiary occupation.
2.3 Data from a high out-migration area (RICE survey)
The NSS surveys enable us to precisely measure employment and wages across India. Unfor-
tunately, the information they collect on short-term migration is rudimentary. In particular,
NSS data only records whether household members have left the village in the last year, not
when and for how long. We complement NSS with an original and detailed survey from a
high out-migration area implemented by the RICE (Coﬀey et al., 2015). This survey pro-
vides detailed information on public employment and migration trips by season, including
the number of days worked under the NREGA and the number of days spent away. This
allows us to take into account the seasonality of public works and short-term migration, and
to study the eﬀect of the program on the duration of migration trips.
2.3.1 Sample Selection
Figure 3 is a map of the RICE survey area with the locations of surveyed villages. Villages
were selected to be on the border of three states: Gujarat, Rajasthan, and Madhya Pradesh.
The location was selected because previous studies in the area reported high rates of out-
migration and poverty (Mosse et al., 2002), and because surveying along the border of
the three states provided variation in state-level policies.14 Each village in Rajasthan was
matched with one village either in Gujarat or in Madhya Pradesh with similar characteristics.
The matching was based on latitude, longitude and proximity to the border, as well as caste
14Besley et al. (2012) followed a similar strategy and surveyed villages at the border of multiple states.
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composition of the population, culturable land, irrigated and non irrigated land per capita.
The RICE survey consists of household, adult, and village modules. The sample includes
705 households living in 70 villages. The household module was completed by the household
head or another knowledgeable member. One-on-one interviews were attempted with each
adult aged 14 to 69 in each household. In 69 of the 70 villages, a local village oﬃcial answered
questions about village-level services, amenities and labor market conditions.15
The analysis in this paper focuses entirely on those adults who completed the full one-on-
one interviews. Table 2 presents means of key variables for the subset of adults who answered
the one-on-one interviews as well as all adults in surveyed households. Out of 2,722 adults
aged 14-69, we were able to complete interviews with 2,224 (81.7%). The fourth column
of the table presents the diﬀerence in means between adults who completed the one-on-one
interview and those who did not. The 498 adults that we were unable to survey are diﬀerent
from adults that were interviewed along a number of characteristics. Perhaps most strikingly,
40% of the adults that we were unable to survey were away from the village for work during
all three seasons of the year compared with eight percent for the adults that we did interview.
It should therefore be kept in mind when interpreting the results that migrants that spend
most of the year away from the village are underrepresented in the sample we use for our
analysis. However, these migrants may be less likely to change their migration behavior in
response to the NREGA: they are half as likely to have ever done NREGA work as other
adults in the sample.16
To assess how the adults in our sample compare with the rural population in India, the
ﬁfth column of Table 2 presents means from the rural sample of the nationally representative
NSS Employment and Unemployment Survey. Literacy rates are substantially lower in the
study sample compared with India as a whole, reﬂecting the fact that the study area is a
particularly poor area of rural India. The NSS asks only one question about short-term
migration, which is whether an individual spent between 30 and 180 days away from the
village for work within the past year. Based on this measure, adults in our sample are 28
percentage points more likely to migrate short-term than adults in India as a whole. The
sixth column shows the short-term migration rate is 16% for the four districts chosen for the
RICE survey according to NSS, which is half the mean in sample villages but well above the
all-India average.
15See Coﬀey et al. (2015) for a detailed description of the RICE survey.
16We can include adults that were not interviewed personally in the analysis by using information collected
from the household head and check that our results are not aﬀected.
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2.3.2 Measuring Migration
The survey instrument was speciﬁcally designed to measure migration, cultivation, and par-
ticipation in the NREGA, which are all highly seasonal. The survey was implemented at the
end of the summer 2010, i.e. when most migrants come back for the start of the agricultural
peak season. Surveyors asked retrospective questions to each household member about each
activity separately for summer 2010, winter 2009-10, monsoon 2009, and summer 2009. Most
respondents were surveyed between mid summer 2010 and early monsoon 2010, so that in
many cases, summer 2010 was not yet complete at the survey date. As a result, when we
refer to a variable computed over the past year, it corresponds to summer 2009, monsoon
2009, and winter 2009-10.17
Table 3 presents descriptive information about short-term migration trips. As expected,
migration is concentrated during the winter and the summer and is much lower during the
peak agricultural season (from July to November). Short-term migrants travel relatively long
distances (300km on average during the summer), and a large majority goes to urban areas
and works in the construction sector. Employer-employee relationships are often short-term:
only 37% of migrants knew their employer or labor contractor before leaving the village.
Living arrangements at destination are rudimentary, with 86% of migrants reporting having
no formal shelter (often a bivouac on the work-site itself). Finally, most migrants travel and
work with family members, only 16% have migrated alone. Column Four presents national
averages from the NSS survey. Migration patterns are similar along the few dimensions
measured in both surveys. The average rural short-term migrant in India as a whole is less
likely to go to urban areas, and more likely to work in the manufacturing or mining sector
than in the our survey sample.
3 Program eﬀect on migration
In this section, we investigate the eﬀect of the NREGA on migration using two diﬀerent
empirical strategies.
17 Respondents were much more familiar with seasons than calendar months, and there is not an exact
mapping from months to seasons. Summer is roughly mid-March through mid-July. The monsoon season is
mid-July through mid-November, and winter is mid-November through mid-March.
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3.1 Evidence from a high out-migration area: empirical strategy
In order to estimate the impact of the NREGA on short-term migration, we ﬁrst use the
RICE survey and compare public employment provision and migration in diﬀerent seasons
in villages in Rajasthan with matched villages in the two neighboring states of Gujarat
and Madhya Pradesh. We exploit the cross-state variation in program implementation and
compare Rajasthan, one of the most proactive state in implementing the NREGA, with
Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh. We also take advantage of public works seasonality and
compare the summer months, where most public employment is provided, to the rest of
the year. Unlike a simple comparison across states, our double-diﬀerences strategy allows
migration levels to be diﬀerent between Rajasthan and the two other states in the winter,
season where migration is present but no public employment is provided. The estimating
equation is:
Yis = α +β0Raji + β1Sums + β3Raji ∗ Sums + γXi + εis (1)
where Yis is the outcome for adult i in season s, Raji is a dummy variable equal to one if
the adult lives in Rajasthan, Sums is a dummy variable equal to one for the summer season
(mid-March to mid-July) and Xi are controls. The vector Xi includes worker characteristics
(gender, age, marital status, languages spoken and education dummies), households char-
acteristics (number of adults, number of children, religion and caste dummies, landholding
in acres, dummies for whether the household has access to a well, to electricity, owns a cell
phone or a TV), village controls listed in Table 4 and village pair ﬁxed eﬀects.18 Standard
errors are clustered at the village level.19
This diﬀerence will be captured by the coeﬃcient β0. In order for β3 to be an estimate of
NREGA impact, villages in Rajasthan need to be comparable with their match on the other
side of the border either in Gujarat or in Madhya Pradesh in all other respects than NREGA
implementation. Potential threats to our identiﬁcation strategy are that villagers across the
border live in diﬀerent socio-economic conditions, have diﬀerent access to infrastructures,
or have beneﬁted from diﬀerent state policies (in education, health etc.). For this reason
it is important to test whether the villages are indeed comparable along these dimensions.
Table 4 presents sample means of village characteristics for village pairs in Rajasthan and
18We also estimate our speciﬁcation including a dummy variable for whether the adult reported being
willing to work more for the NREGA in this particular season and ﬁnd similar results (not reported here).
19We also computed standard errors using two-way clustering at the village and season level following
Cameron et al. (2011) and obtained smaller standard errors.
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Madhya Pradesh and village pairs in Rajasthan and Gujarat. Across all states, villages have
similar demographic and socio-economic characteristics. They have the same population size,
proportion of scheduled tribes, literacy rate, fraction of households who depend on agriculture
as their main source of income, same average land holding and access to irrigation. There are
however signiﬁcant diﬀerences in infrastructure across states. Villages in Madhya Pradesh
are signiﬁcantly further away from the next paved road than matched villages in Rajasthan,
but the diﬀerence is relatively small (600 meters). Villages in Gujarat are closer to railways,
to towns, have greater access to electricity and mobile phone networks. For robustness,
we include all these characteristics in our analysis as controls. Since villages in Gujarat
seem systematically diﬀerent from matched villages in Rajasthan along some important
dimensions, we also implement our estimation excluding pairs with Gujarat villages as a
robustness check.
3.2 Evidence from a high out-migration area: results
We ﬁrst compare public employment provision across states and seasons. We use days worked
for the NREGA in each season as an outcome and estimate Equation 1. The ﬁrst column
of Table 5 conﬁrms that across states, less than one day of public employment is provided
outside of the summer months. During the summer, adults in Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat,
work about six days for NREGA. The coeﬃcient on the interaction of Rajasthan and summer
suggests that in Rajasthan nine more days of public employment are provided. The inclusion
of controls and village pair ﬁxed eﬀect changes the estimated coeﬃcients very little (Column
Two). Panel B in Table 5 presents the estimates obtained without villages on the border of
Gujarat and Rajasthan. Comparing villages on either side of the border between Rajasthan
and Madhya Pradesh, adults in Rajasthan work twice as many days on NREGA work-sites
than adults in Madhya Pradesh who work seven days and a half on average.
Columns Three of Table 5 estimate the same equation with days spent outside the village
for work as the dependent variable. Estimates from Panel A suggest that the average adult in
Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat villages spent 11 days away for work during the monsoon and
winter 2009. Adults in Rajasthan villages spent a day less away for work, but the diﬀerence is
not signiﬁcant. By contrast, in the summer adults in Rajasthan villages spent ﬁve and a half
fewer days on average working outside the village than their counterpart on the other side of
the border, who are away for 24 days on average. We estimate the same speciﬁcation without
the village pairs that include Gujarat villages. The magnitude of the eﬀect increases to eight
and a half days per adult (Column Three Panel B of Table 5). The estimated coeﬃcients
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hardly change with the inclusion of controls and village ﬁxed eﬀects. Taken together, our
estimates suggest that one additional day of NREGA work reduces migration by 0.6 to 1.2
days.20
This eﬀect is the combination of a reduction in the probability of migrating (extensive
margin) and the length of migration trips conditional on migrating (intensive margin). Col-
umn Five and Six of Table 5 estimate Equation 1 taking as outcome a binary variable equal
to one if the adult migrated during the season. In Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat villages,
20% of adults migrated at some point between July 2009 and March 2010. The probability
is exactly the same in Rajasthan villages. During the summer 2009, on average 39% adults
migrated in Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat villages. The proportion of migrants was seven
percentage points lower in Rajasthan villages and the diﬀerence is highly signiﬁcant. Panel
B Column Five of Table 5 presents the estimates when we compare only villages in Mad-
hya Pradesh and Rajasthan. We ﬁnd that the probability of migrating during the summer
months is 10 percentage points lower for adults in Rajasthan. The estimates are robust to
the inclusion of controls and pair ﬁxed eﬀects.21
As detailed in Coﬀey et al. (2015), there are many important diﬀerences among adults
living in Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat. As a result, diﬀerences in migration
could be partly due to preexisting diﬀerences among the states unrelated to the NREGA.
The fact that we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant diﬀerence in winter, when the program is
not implemented but migration is relatively high, gives some reassurance that migration
patterns are not systematically diﬀerent across-states. We also compare the number of long-
term migrants across states, i.e. individuals who changed residence and left the household
in the last ﬁve years, and ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerences (see Appendix Table A.2). Finally,
our survey included retrospective questions about migration trips in previous years. Using
non-missing responses, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in migration levels in 2004 and 2005,
i.e. before NREGA was implemented.22
In the next section, we present our second identiﬁcation strategy which uses NSS data
before and after NREGA implementation and enables us to test for pre-existing diﬀerences
20We repeat the same analysis including adults who were not interviewed personally but about whom
information was collected from the household head. The results, shown in Appendix Table A.1 are extremely
similar. As discussed in Section 2.3 adults who were not interviewed personally are more likely to migrate
in all seasons, and hence less likely to change their migration behavior in response to the NREGA.
21We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the number of trips made during the season between villages in
Rajasthan and villages in Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh (results not shown).
22Less than 50% of respondents remembered whether they migrated before 2005, so we cannot exclude
that migration levels were in fact diﬀerent.
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in migration which may be correlated with NREGA implementation.
3.3 All-India eﬀect on migration: empirical strategy
An important question is whether our ﬁnding that public employment provision under
NREGA reduces short-term migration holds across India. We investigate this question us-
ing nationally representative data from NSS 1999-00 and 2007-08. In order to estimate the
impact of the program on migration and labor markets, we use variation in NREGA imple-
mentation documented in Section 2. When the second NSS survey was carried out between
July 2007 and March 2008, NREGA was implemented in 330 early districts, but not in
the rest of rural India.23 As discussed in Section 2, the quality of NREGA implementation
varied across states, with seven "star states" providing most of NREGA employment. Our
empirical strategy builds on these observations and estimates the impact of the program
by comparing changes in employment and migration between 1999-00 and 2007-08 in early
districts of star states with other rural districts. Our outcomes of interest are the number
of days spent on public works per year, the fraction of adults who have done short-term
migration trips during the past year and the fraction of households which saw any member
leaving during the last year to reside elsewhere.
Let Yiot be the outcome for individual i in rural district of origin o in year t. Let Earlyo
be a binary variable equal to one for early districts, and Staro a binary variable equal to
one for star states. Let Zo denote a vector of district characteristics which do not vary with
time, Xot a vector of district characteristics which do vary with time. District controls are
listed in Table 1. Let Hi be a vector of individual characteristics, including dummies for
gender, education levels, caste, religion and age ranges. We use data from NSS 2007-08 and
estimate the following equation:
Yiot = β0Earlyo + β1Staro + β2Earlyo × Staro
+ δZo + γXot + αHi + ηt + µo + εiot (2)
The main identifying assumption is that absent the NREGA early districts in star states
would have had similar public employment and migration levels as other early districts and
late districts in non-star states. In order to test this hypothesis, we estimate Equation 2
using data from NSS 1999-00, i.e. before the program was implemented. We would expect
23We exclude from the analysis the last quarter of 2007-08, because the NSS survey year ends in June
2008, and NREGA was extended to all rural districts in April 2008.
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no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between early districts of star states and other early districts and
late districts in non-star states.
Combining the two datasets, we can also implement a diﬀerence in diﬀerences strategy
where we compare changes in outcomes in early districts of star states, to changes in other
early districts and changes in late districts in non-star states. Let ηt and µo denote time and
district ﬁxed eﬀects respectively. We use data from NSS 1999-00 and 2007-08 and estimate
the following equation:
Yiot = β0Earlyo × 1{t > 2006}+ β1Staro × 1{t > 2006} (3)
+ β2Earlyo × Staro × 1{t > 2006}+ δZo × 1{t > 2006}+ γXot + αHi + ηt + µo + εiot
The main identifying assumption is now that absent NREGA early phase districts of star
states would have experienced the same trends in short-term migration as the rest of rural
India. Unfortunately, we face two important data limitations which make this assumption
harder to assess. First, as explained in section 2.2 short-term migration is deﬁned diﬀerently
in NSS 1999-00 and 2007-08, so that even if the program had no eﬀect, we may observe
diﬀerential changes in measured migration across districts depending on the prevalence of
migration trips of one to two months, which are counted in 2007-08 but not in 1999-00.
Second, there is no district-level data on short-term migration for pre-1999 or post-2008
which would allow us to test for the existence of diﬀerential trends before or after NREGA
roll-out.
3.4 All-India eﬀect on migration: results
Estimates of the program's impact on public employment are presented in Panel A of Table 6.
Columns One and Two present the estimates of Equation 2 using data from July 2007 to
March 2008, when the NREGA was implemented only in early districts. In late districts of
non-star states there is virtually no public employment provided: adults spend 0.23 days on
public works per day on average. Without controls, the estimated coeﬃcient on the early
district dummy is a signiﬁcant 0.45, which becomes zero after the inclusion of controls. This
conﬁrms that early districts outside of star states provided some, but very little employment
under the NREGA (See Section 2.1). The coeﬃcient on star states is small and insigniﬁcant,
but the coeﬃcient on the interaction is a highly signiﬁcant 4.7, which drops only slightly after
the inclusion of controls. These results suggest that public employment provision under the
NREGA in 2007-08 was concentrated in early districts of star states, and that this diﬀerence
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cannot be explained by diﬀerences in district characteristics. As a check, Column Three
presents the estimates of Equation 2 using data from NSS 1999-00. We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant
diﬀerences in employment provision across early districts and star states, before NREGA
was implemented. We also estimate Equation 3 and ﬁnd no signiﬁcant change in public
employment outside early districts of star states. These results conﬁrm that between 2004-
05 and 2007-08, the NREGA increased employment on rural public works only in early
districts of star states, which is where we expect to ﬁnd an impact on migration. In order
to test whether this eﬀect persisted over time, we estimate Equation 2 using data from NSS
2011-12, three years after the program had been rolled out across India. The results in
Column Five of Panel A in Table 6 suggest that by 2011-12 public employment in other
districts (especially in late districts of star states) had caught up with early districts of star
states.
Estimates of the program impact on short-term migration are presented in Columns One
to Four of Panel B in Table 6. Column One and Two present the estimates of Equation
2 using data from July 2007 to March 2008. Short-term migration is relatively rare in
late phase districts of non-star states: only 1.24 percent of adults have spent one to six
months away for work in the last year. The coeﬃcients with controls suggest that there
is signiﬁcantly more short-term migration in early districts of non-star states with 1.9% of
short-term migrants. The magnitude of the coeﬃcients suggests that the prevalence of short-
term migration in early districts of star-states is much lower, about 1%, but the diﬀerence
is not signiﬁcant. We next estimate Equation 2 on 1999-00 data, and ﬁnd no signiﬁcant
diﬀerences across these districts before NREGA was implemented (Column Three). When
we implement speciﬁcation 3, we ﬁnd that within non-star states, the proportion of rural
adults in early districts which made short-term migration trips during the last year increased
by 0.8 percentage points between 1999-00 and 2007-08, as compared to rural adults in late
phase districts. In late phase districts of star states, the relative increase in the proportion
of short-term migrants was similar, about 0.9. The estimated coeﬃcient on the interaction
term is negative and signiﬁcant, and the point estimate suggests that as compared to other
rural districts short-term migration decreased by 44% in rural districts where NREGA work
was provided. Finally, we estimate Equation 2 using NSS 2007-08 data at the household
level to explore the impact of NREGA on long-term migration. We ﬁnd that the fraction
of households from which at least one member has left during the past year is 6.9% in late
districts of non-star states. We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in long-term migration across
early districts and star states, and the magnitude of the coeﬃcients is much smaller, relative
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to the average in late districts of non star states.
3.5 Eﬀect on migration: discussion
Both empirical strategies independently conﬁrm that the NREGA signiﬁcantly reduced
short-term migration. However, the magnitudes of the estimated impact diﬀer: in response
to a comparable increase in public employment (ﬁve days per adult) the estimated change
in the short-term migration rate is 20% in the RICE survey sample and 44% in NSS. The
diﬀerence between the two estimates may be simply due to some heterogeneity in the impact
of NREGA in the survey sample as compared to the rest of rural India. It may also be due
to the fact that the program impacts migration directly, through increased participation on
public works, but also indirectly, through a rise in private sector wages in rural areas (Im-
bert and Papp, 2015). Since villages in the survey sample are located next to each other and
belong to the same labor market, comparing migration on either side of the state borders
only allows us to capture the direct eﬀect of NREGA employment provision. By contrast,
in the NSS we compare entire districts which are large enough to be distinct labor markets.
Hence by comparing migration across districts, we are likely to capture the eﬀect of rising
private sector wages as well as the eﬀect of public employment provision.
We ﬁnd no evidence of an impact of NREGA on long-term migration. By providing
additional income, the program may encourage long-term migration by alleviating ﬁnancial
constraints (Angelucci, 2013), mitigating income risk (Bianchi and Bobba, 2013) or reducing
household dependence on village-based informal insurance (Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2016).
It is possible that these eﬀects only materialized after a longer period of implementation and
that we are not able to capture them. In particular, our identiﬁcation strategy based on
NSS only estimates the eﬀect of the program one or two years after the program roll-out.
Results from our survey, however, provide suggestive evidence against these eﬀects, as we
do not ﬁnd any systematic diﬀerence in long-term migration in Rajasthan villages which by
the time of the survey had beneﬁtted from higher employment provision for four years.
In 1999-00 early districts of star states were responsible for 20% of short-term migration
ﬂows: hence our estimates suggest that the NREGA may have decreased short-term migra-
tion ﬂows across India by 9%. This estimate is relatively large, and since migrant workers
from rural areas represent an important fraction of the unskilled labor force in urban areas,
one would expect the NREGA to have signiﬁcant eﬀects on urban labor markets. We inves-
tigate this issue empirically in the next section. However, it is important to note that 9%
is likely to be an overstimate of the eﬀect of the program. By decreasing migration from
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early districts of star states the NREGA may increase urban wages, which may attract more
migrants from other rural districts. Hence, the negative impact of the program we estimate
in this section is the combination of a decline in migration in rural areas with NREGA em-
ployment and a rise in migration in other rural areas. Hence the net eﬀect of the program
on short-term migration ﬂows across India is likely to be smaller than 9%. The next section
estimates the eﬀect of the NREGA on urban areas.
4 Equilibrium eﬀect of the program
In this ﬁnal section, we explore the impact of NREGA on urban labor markets via a change
in migration ﬂows from rural areas. Throughout the analysis, we will focus on the market
for casual labor, i.e. manual, short term work, which is the relevant market for short-term
migrants. We ﬁrst outline a simple theoretical model which suggests that small changes in
rural to urban migration may have large impacts on urban labor markets. We next estimate
a gravity model to predict migration ﬂows from rural to urban districts and construct a
measure of reliance of each urban center on rural migration from districts with high NREGA
employment and from other rural districts. Finally, we estimate the eﬀect of the program
on urban labor markets by comparing changes in outcomes in urban districts that are more
or less exposed to changes in migration due to NREGA.
4.1 Urban labor market equilibrium model
In order to calibrate the potential eﬀects of changes in migration ﬂows due to NREGA,
we present a simple model of the urban labor market equilibrium. Let Du denote labor
demand in urban areas, Lu labor supply of urban workers and Lm short-term migration
ﬂows between rural and urban areas. Assuming that the urban labor market is competitive
and that residents and short-term migrants are perfect substitutes, the urban wage wu clears
the market: Du = Lu + Lm. Let us consider the eﬀect of an exogenous change in migration
inﬂow dLm due to the implementation of a public works program in the rural area. Let
α = Lm
Lu
denote the ratio of labor supply from rural migrants divided by the labor supply of
urban workers. The higher α, the more the urban center relies on migrant labor to satisfy
its demand for labor. Let ηD and ηS denote labor demand and labor supply elasticities,
respectively. One can express the elasticity of the urban wage with respect to migration as
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a function of α, ηD and ηS:
dw
w
/
dLm
Lm
= − α
ηS − ηD(1 + α) (4)
Unless the elasticity of labor supply is negative and large, the elasticity of the urban wage
with respect to migration is negative, i.e. a decrease in migration caused by the introduction
of a public works program in rural areas will increase urban wages. As long as the elasticity
of labor demand is lower than one, the elasticity of urban wages with respect to migration is
increasing in α, i.e. the more an urban area relies on migrant labor, the more sensitive the
wage to changes in migration inﬂows.
A simple calibration may provide a better idea of the potential magnitude of the eﬀect
of a change in rural short-term migration on urban labor markets. From NSS 2007-08 data,
the estimated number of rural short-term migrants is 8.1 million and the number of urban
adults who declare doing casual labor as a primary or secondary occupation is 15 million.
This yields an estimate of α for urban India α̂ = 0.53.24 For the sake of the calibration,
let us now assume that the elasticity of labor demand of urban India is ηD = −0.4 and the
elasticity of labor supply is ηS = 0.1.
25 . The implied elasticity of urban wages to migration
is −0.7, i.e. a decrease in short-term migration from rural areas by 1% would increase urban
wages by 0.7%. Given the size of the rural population (476 million adults, according to NSS
2007-08), a 1% decline in migration would require that only a very small fraction of rural
adults (0.02% or 80 thousands workers) stopped migrating. The estimates presented in the
previous section suggest that the NREGA may have reduced short-term migration by up to
9%, which would imply an increase in wages by 6%. Assuming higher labor demand and
labor supply elasticities would yield lower estimates, but under reasonable assumptions one
expects the program to have large impacts on wages wages for casual labor in urban areas.
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It is straightforward to extend the model to the case of two rural locations (denoted 1
and 2), of which only location 1 experiences an exogenous change in migration due to the
24Both the numerator and the denominator of the migration rate are likely to be underestimated. On
the one hand, the NSS migration measure only captures trips from one to six months, excluding longer and
shorter short-term trips. On the other, there may be more casual laborers in the cities, for example rural
workers who commute to the cities.
25These numbers are consistent with the existing literature on rural labor markets in India (Binswanger
and Rosenzweig, 1984) and the literature on unskilled migration (Borjas, 2003). In Imbert and Papp (2014)
we estimate labor demand elasticity in rural India to be −0.38.
26Due to the much larger size of the rural workforce, the eﬀect of changes in short-term migration on rural
wages is likely to be small. Imbert and Papp (2015) study the eﬀect of the program on rural wages.
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implementation of a public works program. We denote by α1 =
L1m
Lu
and α2 =
L2m
Lu
the ratio
of labor supply of migrants from rural area 1 and 2 respectively, divided by the labor supply
of urban workers. Let us denote by ηM the elasticity of migration with respect to the urban
wage. The elasticity of urban wages with respect to an exogenous change in migration from
location 1 is given by:
dw
w
/
dL1m
L1m
= − α1
ηS + ηMα2 − ηD(1 + α1 + α2) (5)
Assuming that the elasticity of migration with respect to a change in urban wages is positive,
a drop in migration from location 1 increases migration from location 2, which in turn
mitigates the eﬀect of the program on urban wages. For a given level of migration from rural
areas with the program, one would hence expect urban centers which receive more migration
from rural areas without the program to experience lower increases in wages.
4.2 Predicting short-term migration ﬂows
We now turn to the estimation of the eﬀect of the NREGA on urban labor markets. For this
we ﬁrst need to predict short-term migration ﬂows, and estimate for each urban center the
empirical counterpart of α1 and α2, the ratio of short term migrants from rural areas with
and without the NREGA divided by the number of urban workers.
As discussed in Section 2.2, we know whether rural short-term migrants went to an urban
center, but we do not know their exact destination. We only know whether they went to the
same district, another district of the same state or another state. In order to allocate short-
term migrants to a particular destination, we use data on the origin of long-term migrants
who came from rural areas and settled in urban areas between 1991 and 2000, according
to the 2001 census. For these long-term migrants, we know whether they came from the
same district, another district of the same state or another state, and which state they came
from. We compute for each urban district the fraction of rural long-term migrants who came
from a given state. We next use this fraction to allocate rural short term migrants from
each state to urban districts across India.27 This provides us with an estimate of mod, the
number of short-term migrants from rural parts of district o to urban parts of district d in
2007-08. The underlying assumption is that short and long-term migration follow the same
geographical patterns. This assumption can be justiﬁed by the role of family, village and
sub-caste networks in migration decisions, which give rise to "chain migration" (Card and
27 The details of our method are described in Appendix A.
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DiNardo, 2000; Munshi, 2003).
We next build a gravity model that predicts migration ﬂows based on district characteris-
tics independent of the NREGA. For this we use the distance between district o and district
d (which we denote δod) and an index of language proximity between origin and destination
(Iod).
28 We also use average real wages at origin and destination (wo and wd respectively),
the number of casual workers at origin and destination (No and Nd respectively) estimated
from NSS 2004-05, before the NREGA was in place. We include a dummy which equals to
one when origin and destination belong to the same state (So = Sd) and a dummy which
equals to one when origin and destination are in the same district (o = d). The model is
estimated using Poisson-quasi maximum likelihood, which has the advantage of taking into
account pairs of districts with no migrants, and has been shown to perform well in trade
gravity models (Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). The estimating equation is:
mod = β1log(δod) +β2log(wo) + β3log(wd) + β4log(No)
+β5log(Nd) +β6Iod + β71{So = Sd}+ β81{o = d}+ εod (6)
Finally, we construct for each urban center the empirical counterparts of α1 and α2 in the
theoretical framework, i.e. the measure of exposure to changes in migration from districts
where public employment is provided and from districts where no public employment is
provided. m̂od is predicted short-term migration from rural district o to urban district d.
Let Ld denote the number of casual workers living in urban district d in 2004-05 (estimated
as explained in Section 2.2). In order to measure the exposure of each urban district to
migration ﬂows, we construct the two following ratios:
α̂1d =
∑
o∈StarEarly m̂od
Ld
and α̂2d =
∑
o/∈StarEarly m̂od
Ld
α1d and α2d are the ratio of the number of predicted short-term migrants to district d coming
from early districts of star states and from other rural districts respectively, divided by the
estimated number of casual workers living in d.
We ﬁrst estimate equation 6 to predict migration ﬂows between rural-urban district pairs.
As Table A.3 in the appendix shows, the determinants of migration all have a signiﬁcant
impact on migration ﬂows, and their coeﬃcients have the expected signs. Distance negatively
28The index of language proximity is the probability that two individuals picked at random from origin
and from destination share a common language. Details of the construction of the index can be found in
appendix.
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aﬀects the number of migrants. Wages at destination and origin have a positive and negative
impact on migration, respectively. We predict more migration between districts with a larger
number of casual workers. Migrants are more likely to go to districts where more people
have a language in common with them. Finally, rural short-term migrants are more likely to
migrate to urban centers in the same state. These eﬀects are robust to the model used, and
to diﬀerent deﬁnitions of the outcome variable. In the following we use predictions from the
Poisson model, whose estimates are shown in Column Four of Table A.3.
We next use predicted migration ﬂows to compute the two ratios α1 and α2, which
measure the importance of migration ﬂows from early districts in star states and from other
rural districts respectively, as a fraction of the urban casual labor force. Table A.4 in the
appendix presents the weighted average of these estimates for each state. States in which
urban areas rely heavily on short-term migrants from early districts of star states are some
of the star states themselves (Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan). Delhi,
Himachal Pradesh and Haryana receive high levels of migration both from early districts of
star states and from other rural districts. Many states with high levels of rural migration
do not rely on rural migrants from early phase districts of star states. We use this variation
across urban labor markets to identify the eﬀect of changes in migration induced by the
NREGA.
4.3 Program eﬀect on urban labor markets: strategy
Using our measure of exposure of each urban center to changes in short-term migration ﬂows,
we next estimate the impact of the NREGA on urban labor markets. Our identiﬁcation
strategy consists of comparing changes in wages in urban centers which rely more on short-
term migration from rural areas where the program is implemented (high α1d) to outcomes in
centers for which migration is less important relative to the resident casual workforce (low
α1d). For a given level of α
1
d, we further compare urban centers which attract migrants from
rural areas without the program (high α2d) to districts that do not. We predict a relative
increase in wages in urban centers which rely more on migrants coming from rural areas
where the program reduces migration, and we predict wages to remain stable or decrease in
urban centers which rely more on migrants coming from rural areas where the program is
not implemented.
Let Yidt denote the outcome for individual i living in urban district d in quarter t. Let
Zd and Xdt denote a vector of time-invariant and time varying characteristics of district d.
Let Hi denote a vector of individual characteristics. Finally let ηt and µd denote time and
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district ﬁxed eﬀects. In order to estimate the impact of the program on urban labor market
outcomes, we use data from 2004-05 and 2007-08 and compare changes in outcomes in urban
centers for which migration from early districts of star states is more or less important. Our
outcomes are log deﬂated casual earnings, and salaried earnings, time spent on casual wage
work, salaried wage work, self employment, domestic work, unemployment and out of the
labor force. We estimate the following equation by ordinary least squares:
Ydt = β0 + β1α̂1d × 1{t > 2006}+ β2α̂2d × 1{t > 2006}
+ δZd × 1{t > 2006}+ γXdt + αHi + ηt + µd + εdt (7)
For inference purposes, we need to account both for the fact that regressors α̂1d and α̂2d are
estimated from equation 6 and that error terms in equation 7 are likely correlated for ob-
servations pertaining to the same district. We hence bootstrap standard errors by repeating
the estimation of models 6 and 7 on random district draws.
A potential threat to our identiﬁcation strategy is that urban centers which hire more
migrants from early districts of star states may be on diﬀerent economic trends, and hence
would exhibit diﬀerential changes in labor market outcomes even without the NREGA. As
a ﬁrst robustness check, we use a placebo strategy and compare trends in labor market out-
comes in urban districts which have more or less exposure to migration from early districts
of star states between 1999-00 and 2004-05, before the NREGA was implemented, and be-
tween 2007-08 and 2011-12, i.e. after the NREGA was rolled out across India. As a second
robustness check, we estimate the same equation using salaried wages as a dependent vari-
ables. Salaried workers are skilled workers hired on long-term contracts, and hence do not
belong to the same labor market as unskilled short-term migrants. Depending on the level
of complementarity between skilled and unskilled workers, a change in unskilled wages could
aﬀect wages for skilled workers. However, the eﬀect on skilled wages is likely to be small, as
compared to the eﬀect on unskilled wages. Hence if we ﬁnd that salaried earnings exhibit
very diﬀerent trends in labor markets which hire more or less migrants from early districts
of star states, it would suggest they may be on diﬀerent economic trajectories unrelated to
the program. As a third check, we estimate equation 7 including time speciﬁc trends for
early phase districts, for star states and for early phase districts in star states, in order to
control for direct eﬀects of public employment provision and for state speciﬁc policies or
macro-economic shocks which may have aﬀected urban wage growth.
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4.4 Program eﬀect on urban labor markets: results
Table 7 presents the estimated eﬀect of the NREGA on urban wages. We ﬁnd that between
2004-05 and 2007-08, urban centers with higher migration rates from early districts of star
states have experienced a relative increase in wages. The estimated coeﬃcient suggests that
in the average urban district, for which the migration rate from early districts in star states
is 10%, wages have increased by 7%. The magnitude of the estimate declines slightly with
the inclusion of district and worker controls to 6%. A 6-7% increase in wages is consistent
with the results of our calibration. We also ﬁnd evidence of a mitigating impact through
increased migration from rural districts that do not have the program. For a given migration
rate from early districts of star states, an urban center with a 10% higher migration rate
from other rural districts experienced a 1% lower wage growth. In the average urban center,
for which the migration rate from other rural districts is 40%, the increase in wages (+6%)
caused by a drop in migration from rural areas with the NREGA was partly compensated
by an increase in migration from areas without the NREGA (-4%). This mitigating eﬀect
may have been short-lived however, since the program was later implemented across India.
As a robustness check, we estimate the same speciﬁcation using data from 1999-00 and
2004-05 and from 2007-08 and 2011-12. We ﬁnd no evidence that wages followed diﬀerent
trends in urban centers with more migration from early districts in star states either before
the program was implemented, or after it was rolled out across India (Column Three and
Four of Table 7). We estimate our speciﬁcation using wages for salaried work as an outcome.
Our results, presented in Column Five of Table 7 suggest salaried wages increased in urban
centers with more migration from early districts of star states, but the coeﬃcient is twice
as small and insigniﬁcant. We also estimate our speciﬁcation allowing for speciﬁc trends for
early phase districts, for star states and for early phase districts of star states and ﬁnd similar
estimates (see Appendix Table A.5). These results provide some reassurance that our ﬁndings
are not driven by economic shocks or policies correlated with NREGA implementation. They
also conﬁrm that because of the relatively long distances travelled by short-term migrants,
the spillover eﬀects of the program on urban labor markets are not limited to districts or
states that implement the NREGA, but geographically widespread. This also suggest that
the spillover eﬀects are due to migration rather than local changes in rural demand for urban
goods or investment of rural households in urban ﬁrms (Marden, 2015; Santangelo, 2016).
Finally, Table 8 presents the estimated impact on time allocation of urban workers with
and without district controls. We ﬁnd evidence of an increase in time spent doing casual
labor and a decrease in time spent being self-employed among residents in urban centers
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exposed to a drop in migration. This ﬁnding is consistent with an increase in wage work
by urban residents in response to an increase in urban wages. However, the point estimates
are very sensitive to the inclusion of controls, and the magnitude of the eﬀects is somewhat
too large. The estimated coeﬃcient with (resp. without) controls suggests that a 10%
higher migration rate increases time spent doing casual labor by 0.8 (resp. 0.3) percentage
points, which is equivalent to a 14% (resp. 5%) increase in casual labor. Given that the
corresponding wage increase is only 6-7%, these estimates imply a labor supply elasticity
which is implausibly large. We also ﬁnd evidence of a decrease in casual labor and increase
in self-employment in urban centers which receive more migrants from rural districts that
do not have the program.29 Overall, our results show that through its eﬀect on short-term
migration, the NREGA has had a large impact on urban labor markets.
5 Conclusion
This paper provides two new pieces of evidence. First, we show that a large rural anti-poverty
program reduces short-term (or seasonal) migration to urban areas. Theoretically, a workfare
program may have ambiguous eﬀects on migration. By providing additional income, it may
relax credit constraints and increase migration (Angelucci, 2013). By improving employment
opportunities in rural areas, it may also increase the opportunity cost of migration (Imbert
and Papp, 2014). Finally, by providing an alternative form of insurance, it may decrease the
need for risk-scoping migration (Morten, 2012). We provide evidence that in the case of the
NREGA, the net eﬀect is negative.
Second, we ﬁnd that changes in short-term migration induced by the program have a
signiﬁcant impact on the market for unskilled casual work in urban areas. To our knowledge,
our study is the ﬁrst to present evidence on the role of seasonal migration in the reallocation
of labor across space and economic sectors in developing countries. We show that seasonal
ﬂows are highly responsive to changes to employment opportunities in rural areas and are
large enough to impact the labor market equilibrium in urban areas. Taken together, these
ﬁndings suggest that migration responses and potential spillover eﬀects on urban areas should
be taken into account while designing rural anti-poverty policies.
29These eﬀects remain when we allow for diﬀerent trends in early districts, star states, and early districts
of star states (see Table A.6).
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A Appendix
A.1 District Controls
Census A number of the district controls are computed from the primary census abstract
of 2001. In all cases, we use information for rural areas only, which we then aggregate to the
district level. We compute fraction of scheduled tribes and fraction of scheduled castes by
dividing by total population. Population density is obtained by dividing total population
by total area. Literacy rate is computed by dividing the number of literate person. Finally,
we use information from the census village directory to compute irrigated cultivable land
per capita and non irrigated cultivable land per capita as well as the fraction of villages
accessed by paved road, the fraction of villages with bus service, with education facility,
medical facility, Post and Telecom facilities, bank, and electricity connection.
Agricultural Productivity: We compute agricultural productivity per worker for each
agricultural year in each district using two sources of data. First, the Ministry of Agri-
culture publishes yearly data on output and harvest prices of 36 grain and cash crops in
every district 30. This allows us to compute the value of agricultural production for every
district-year. Second, we use National Sample Survey data to estimate the number of (self
employed and wage) workers active in agriculture for every district-year. NSS survey years
match exactly the Ministry of Agriculture deﬁnition of agricultural years (July-June). Hence,
dividing output value by the number of agricultural workers yields agricultural productivity
per worker for each NSS survey year.
Rainfall To control for monthly rainfall at the district level over the period 1999-2010, we
use data from the Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission (TRMM), which is a joint mission
between NASA and the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA). The TRMM Multi-
Satellite Precipitation Analysis provides rainfall data for every three hours at a resolution of
0.25 by 0.25 degree grid-cell size. Rainfall measurement are made by satellite and calibrated
using monthly rain gauge analysis data from the Global Precipitation Climatology Project
(GPCP).31 The data is then aggregated to obtain mean monthly rainfall for every cell, and
30Data is available at http://eands.dacnet.nic.in/.
31Data is available at http://trmm.gsfc.nasa.gov/. See ? presents the data in more details.
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scaled up to the district level by averaging over the cells which overlap with a district (there
are on average six grid-cells per district). We compute cumulative rainfall in each district-
month as the sum of rainfall since the last July 1st, and express it as percentage deviation
from the 1998-2011 mean for this district-month.
Other district controls "Pre-election year" is a dummy for whether state assembly or
Panchayati Raj (local) elections are to be held in the following year. To construct this
control, we used online reports from the Electoral Commission of India32 and from the State
Election Commissions of each states. State Government Politically Aligned with Central
Government is a dummy variable for whether the Chief Minister of a state is member
of a party which participates to the Central Government. Log Spending on Rural Roads
Program per Capita is the log of expenditures made in a district under the Pradhan Mantri
Gram Sarak Yozna (PMGSY) divided by the population of the district according to the
2001 census.33 Log Spending on Watershed Programs per Capita is the log of expenditures
made in a state under the Integrated Wasteland Development Program (IWDP), the Desert
Development Program (DDP) and the Drought Prone Area Program (DPAP) divided by
the population in the state according to the 2001 census.34
A.2 Rural-Urban Short-term Migration Matrix
In this section we describe in details how we assign rural short-term migrants observed in
NSS Employment Survey 2007-08 to a particular district of destination. NSS Employment
Survey reports destination into seven categories: same district (rural or urban), other district
in the same state (rural or urban), another state (rural or urban), and another country. The
issue is hence to predict the district of destination for migrants who went to urban areas of
the same state or went to urban areas of another state. For this purpose, we use Census 2001
information on permanent migrants, i.e. prime age adults living in urban areas who changed
residence in the last 10 years and came from rural areas, for which the census records the
state of previous residence.
Let Mod and mod denote respectively long and short-term migration ﬂows from the rural
part of district o to the urban part of district d. Let So be the state of origin and Sd the
state of destination. From the NSS Employment survey, we observe short-term migration
32http://www.eci.nic.in/ecimain1/index.aspx
33Financial reports for PMGSY are available online at http://pmgsy.nic.in/
34Financial reports for IWDP DDP and DPAP are available online at
http://watershedmpr.nic.in/reports.aspx
28
within the same district (moo), to another district from the same state (
∑
d,o∈Sd,o 6=dmod))
and to another state (
∑
d,So 6=Sdmod). From Census 2001 data, for each urban destination
d, we observe long-term migration from the same district (Mdd), long-term migration from
other districts of the same state (
∑
i∈Sd,i 6=dMid), and long-term migration from each state
(
∑
i∈So,So 6=SdMid). We combine these pieces of information to predict short-term migration
ﬂows mod.
Our method relies on two assumptions. First, we need to assume that the proportion
of short-term migrants who go from district o to another district d of the same state is the
same as the proportion of long-term migrants in district d who come from another district
of the same state. Second, we need to assume that the proportion of short-term migrants
who go from district o in state So to district d in another state is the same as the proportion
of long term migrants in district d who come from state So. Formally, we use the following
algorithm to predict short-term rural to urban migration ﬂows:
m̂od =

mod if o=d
∑
i∈Sd,i 6=dMid∑
j∈Sd
∑
i∈Sd,i 6=dMij
∑
j,Sj=So,j 6=omoj if o 6= dand So = Sd
∑
i∈So Mid∑
j∈Sd
∑
i∈So Mij
∑
j,Sj 6=Somoj if o 6= dand So 6= Sd
A.3 Weighting
The NSSO provides sample weights which ensure that the weighted mean of each outcome
is an unbiased estimate of the average of the outcome for the population National Sample
Survey Oﬃce (2010). For the purpose of our analysis, we re-weight observations so that
the sum of all weights within each district is constant over time and proportional to the
rural population of the district as estimated from the NSS Employment Surveys. When
we use NSSO survey weights without re-weighting, the results are almost identical to our
main results (results not shown). As compared to using ordinary least squares without any
weighting, our approach allows us to make sure that our results are not driven by smaller
districts with few observations for casual wages. More concretely, let wi be the weight for
person i, and let Ωdt be the set of all persons surveyed in district d at time t. Then the new
weight for person i is wi × ωd∑
i∈Ωdt wi
where ωd is the population weight for district d.
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A.4 Construction of District Panel
During the period covered by the analysis, some districts split while other districts merged
together. Constructing the district panel requires matching districts both over time as well
as across data sets. Fortunately, the NSS district deﬁnitions for surveying stayed constant
from 2004 to 2008, despite splits and merges. We therefore use the NSS district deﬁnitions
from this period and match other data sets to these. We ﬁrst match the NSS 1999-2000
to 2004-05 and 2007-08 data. All districts could be matched between the two surveys but
for ﬁve districts missing in 1999-00. However about ﬁfty of them had split between 1999-00
and 2005-05. We adopt the following procedure If a given district has split in x districts
(x is most of the time equal to two, sometimes three), we duplicate observations from that
district x times so that one set of observation can be matched with one of the newly created
district. In order to keep the total weight of that district constant, we divide each weight
in the 1999-00 data-set by x. We further match NSS data with the Census 2001, NREGA
phases, agricultural productivity, rainfall, PMGSY and IWDP/DDP/DPAP spending data
from 2001 to 2010.
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Figure 1: Cross-state variation in public employment provision
Figure 2: Unexplained cross-state variation in public employment provision
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Figure 3: Map of short-term migration
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Table 2: RICE survey Sample
All Adults
Full Adult 
Survey 
Completed
Adult Survey 
not Completed
Difference      
(3) - (2)
All Adults 
(India)
All Adults 
(Sample 
Districts)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (5)
Female 0.511 0.525 0.448 -0.077 0.497 0.494
(0.0056) (0.0166) (0.0067) (0.019) (0.001) (0.0072)
Married 0.704 0.729 0.594 -0.134 0.693 0.720
(0.0091) (0.021) (0.0105) (0.0233) (0.0018) (0.0177)
Illiterate 0.666 0.683 0.590 -0.093 0.388 0.498
(0.0185) (0.0325) (0.0189) (0.0302) (0.0029) (0.0298)
Scheduled Tribe 0.897 0.894 0.910 0.016 0.104 0.655
(0.0272) (0.0278) (0.0287) (0.0225) (0.0032) (0.0592)
Age 32.8 34.1 27.0 -7.11 34.4 32.8
(0.248) (0.484) (0.301) (0.592) (0.0463) (0.4684)
Spent 2-330 days away for work 0.433 0.422 0.482 0.060 -- --
(0.0179) (0.0394) (0.0187) (0.0412)
Migrated for Work all Three Seasons 0.119 0.080 0.295 0.215 -- --
(0.011) (0.0318) (0.0101) (0.0324)
Ever Worked for NREGA 0.528 0.581 0.291 -0.290 -- --
(0.0253) (0.0354) (0.0259) (0.0332)
Spent 30-180 days away for work 0.301 0.312 0.251 -0.061 0.025 0.160
(0.0159) (0.0351) (0.0166) (0.0362) (0.0008) (0.0344)
Adults 2,722 2,224 498 212,848 2,144
Own Survey NSS Survey 2007-08
The unit of observation is an adult. Standard errors computed assuming correlation of errors at the village level in parentheses. The first four 
columns present means based on subsets of the adults aged 14 to 69 from the main data set discussed in the paper. The first column includes the 
full sample of persons aged 14 to 69 for whom the adult survey was attempted. The second column includes all persons aged 14 to 69 for which 
the full adult survey was completed. The third column includes all persons aged 14 to 69 for which the full adult survey was not completed. The 
fourth column presents the difference between the third and second columns. The fifth and sixth columns present means computed using all 
adults aged 14 to 69 in the  rural sample of the NSS Employment and Unemployment survey Round 64 conducted between July 2007 and June 
2008 for all of India and for the six sample districts respectively. Means from the NSS survey are constructed using sampling weights. "--" 
denotes not available.
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Table 3: Migration patterns
NSS
Summer 
2009
Monsoon 
2009
Winter    
2009-10
Year   
2007-08
Migrated? 35% 10% 29% 2.5%
Migrant is female 40% 33% 43% 14%
Migrated with Household Member 71% 63% 74% 43%
Distance (km) 300 445 286 -
Transportation Cost (Rs) 116 144 107 -
Duration (days) 54 52 49 -
Destination is in same state 15% 24% 23% 53%
Destination is urban 84% 88% 73% 68%
Worked in agriculture 14% 21% 35% 24%
Worked in manufacturing and mining 9% 5% 6% 18%
Worked in construction 70% 70% 56% 42%
Worked in other sector (including services) 8% 4% 4% 16%
Found employer after leaving 63% 64% 54% -
No formal shelter in destination 86% 85% 83% -
Observations (All) 2224 2224 2224 212848
Observations (Migrants only) 768 218 646 13682
Migration Survey
Source: Retrospective questions from the migration survey implemented in summer 2010. 
The unit of observation is an adult. Each column restricts the sample to responses for a 
particular season. Seasons are defined as follows: summer from April to June, monsoon from 
July to September, winter from December to March.
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Table 4: Village Balance
RJ Mean MP Mean Difference RJ Mean GJ Mean Difference
Matching variables
Frac Population SC 0% 1% 0.74 1% 0% 0.24
Frac Population ST 96% 96% 0.99 98% 99% 0.35
Total culturable land 160.5 161.0 0.99 250.3 235.0 0.85
Frac culturable land irrigated 25% 25% 0.97 31% 27% 0.67
Frac culturable land non irrigated 59% 59% 0.93 57% 50% 0.51
Population per ha of culturable land 3.5 3.5 1.00 5.7 5.6 0.98
Village and household controls
Total Population 570 576 0.95 1324 1276 0.90
Frac Population Literate 24% 26% 0.49 29% 34% 0.19
Bus Service? 16% 16% 1.00 40% 90% 0.02
Distance to Paved Road (km) 0.3 0.9 0.08 0.5 0.3 0.71
Distance to Railway (km) 50.2 44.7 0.32 73.9 47.2 0.05
Distance to Town (km) 10.5 11.2 0.78 6.1 10.0 0.06
Farm is HH Main Income Source 57% 55% 0.75 42% 42% 1.00
HH Land owned (Acres) 3.0 2.8 0.60 2.4 2.4 0.91
% HH with electricity 23% 33% 0.18 22% 57% 0.02
% HH with cellphone 35% 33% 0.76 33% 55% 0.02
% HH with access to a well 47% 52% 0.50 38% 58% 0.12
% HH which uses irrigation 50% 54% 0.68 60% 52% 0.59
Number of villages 25 25 10 10
MP-RJ Pairs GJ-RJ Pairs
Village characteristics are from the Census 2001 and household characteristics from our own 
survey. The following acronyms are used for state names: RJ for Rajasthan, MP for Madhya 
Pradesh and GJ for Gujarat. Differences are normalized, i.e. divided by the standard deviation 
of the covariate in the sample. A difference of more than 0.25 standard deviations is 
considered as substantial (Imbens and Wooldridge 2009). All village and household 
characteristics listed in this table are included as control in our main specification.
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Table 5: Impact of the NREGA on public employment and migration (Survey Sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: All village pairs
Rajasthan -0.117 -0.955** -1.177 -1.119 -0.0114 -0.0124
(0.183) (0.474) (1.671) (1.700) (0.0232) (0.0209)
Summer (March-July) 5.982*** 5.982*** 13.30*** 13.30*** 0.187*** 0.187***
(0.802) (0.807) (1.746) (1.755) (0.0209) (0.0211)
Rajasthan x Summer 8.990*** 8.990*** -5.503** -5.503** -0.0703** -0.0703**
(1.128) (1.134) (2.203) (2.216) (0.0268) (0.0269)
Observations 6,588 6,588 6,588 6,588 6,588 6,588
Mean in MP and GJ from July to March .67 .67 10.69 10.69 .2 .2
Worker Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Village Pair Fixed Effect No Yes No Yes No Yes
Panel B: Excluding GJ-RJ Pairs
Rajasthan -0.231 -0.335 -0.381 -1.271 -0.000557 -0.0221
(0.220) (0.468) (1.827) (1.652) (0.0256) (0.0220)
Summer (March-July) 7.606*** 7.606*** 17.24*** 17.24*** 0.233*** 0.233***
(0.895) (0.901) (1.918) (1.931) (0.0226) (0.0228)
Rajasthan x Summer 7.408*** 7.408*** -8.640*** -8.640*** -0.107*** -0.107***
(1.281) (1.290) (2.570) (2.587) (0.0301) (0.0303)
Observations 4,677 4,677 4,677 4,677 4,677 4,677
Mean in MP from July to March .85 .85 8.77 8.77 .18 .18
Worker Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Village Pair Fixed Effect No Yes No Yes No Yes
The unit of observation is an adult in a given season.  Results in Panel B are based on pairs of villages in Madhya 
Pradesh and Rajasthan only. Column One and Two presents results from a regression of days spent working on the 
NREGA during a particular season on a set of explanatory variables. In Column Three and Four the outcome is the 
number of days spent away for work. In Column Five and Six the outcome is a binary variable equal to one if the 
adult spent some time away for work during a particular season. Rajasthan is a dummy for whether the adult lives 
within a village in Rajasthan. Summer is a dummy for the summer months (mid-March to mid-July) Standard errors 
are computed assuming correlation of errors within villages. All regressions include a constant. ***, ** and * 
indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. 
NREGA Days Days away Any migration trip
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Table 6: Impact of the NREGA on public employment and migration (NSS Sample)
Panel A: Public Employment
2007-08 2007-08 1999-00 1999-00 2007-08 2011-12
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Early District 0.447*** -0.178 0.270 -0.290 0.638
(0.154) (0.284) (0.288) (0.385) (0.563)
Star State 0.251 -0.355 -0.0744 -0.0493 3.811***
(0.208) (0.417) (0.314) (0.496) (0.906)
Early X Star 4.651*** 4.579*** -0.379 4.959*** -0.283
(1.017) (0.971) (0.449) (1.097) (1.200)
Mean in Other Districts 0.23 0.23 0.28 . 0.95
Observations 159,849 159,849 251,847 411,696 321,673
Workers Controls No Yes No Yes Yes
District Controls No Yes No Yes Yes
District fixed effect No No No Yes No
Panel B: Migration Long-term Migration
2007-08 2007-08 1999-00 1999-00 2007-08 2007-08
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Early District 2.111*** 0.678* -0.173 0.842* 0.903
(0.355) (0.406) (0.329) (0.462) (0.691)
Star State 0.675** 0.292 -0.530* 0.955** 1.045
(0.290) (0.393) (0.310) (0.428) (0.991)
Early X Star -1.507*** -0.914 0.501 -1.427* -0.906
(0.539) (0.736) (0.528) (0.733) (1.007)
Mean in Other Districts 1.24 1.24 1.45 . 6.92
Observations 159,849 159,849 248,074 407,923 159,849
Workers Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
District Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
District Fixed Effect No No No Yes No
Short-term Migration
In Panel A and Panel B Column 1 to 4 the unit of observation is a rural adult. In Column 5 of panel B the unit of 
observation is a rural household. Each column presents results from a separate regression. In Panel A the 
outcome is the estimated number of days spent on public works per adult per year. In Panel B Columns 1 to 4 
the outcome is a binary variable which is equal to 100 if workers have spent one to six months away from work 
during the last year and zero otherwise. In Panel B Column 5 the unit of observation is a household and the 
outcome is a binary variable equal to 100 if any household member has moved out of the household in the last 
year. Early District is a dummy variable equal to one for districts in which NREGA is implemented in 2007-08. 
Star state is a dummy variable equal to one for Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Madhya 
Pradesh, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu and Uttarkhand. District Controls are presented in Table 1. For the 
specification presented in column Four the dummies Early District and Star State, as well as time invariant 
controls are interacted with a time dummy equal to one for the period 2007-08.  Standard errors are clustered at 
the district level. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. 
Days spent on public works per adult per year
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Table 7: Program eﬀect on urban casual wages
Log Salaried 
Wage
1999-00   
2004-05
2007-08   
2011-12
2004-05                              
2007-08
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Migration rate from early 
districts of star states 0.695*** 0.608*** -0.346 0 0.345
(0.262) (0.25) (0.221) (0.213) (0.24)
Migration rate from other 
rural districts -0.146* -0.108* 0.0598 -0.084 -0.081
(0.088) (0.065) (0.074) (0.066) (0.064)
Observations 14,815 14,815 20,388 12,654 34,097
District Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Worker Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
        is the ratio of the predicted number of rural migrants from early districts of star states on the number 
of urban residents who do casual work.         is the ratio of the predicted number of migrants from other 
rural districts on the number of residents who do casual work. In column 1, 2 and 4 the sample is 
composed of urban adults surveyed in NSS from July 2004 to June 2005 and July 2007 to March 2008. 
In column 3 the sample is composed of urban adults surveyed in NSS from July 2007 to March 2008 and 
July 2011 to June 2012. Each column presents results from a separate regression. In columns 1 to 3, the 
outcome is log deflated casual earnings. In column 4 the outcome is log deflated salaried earnings. 
District Controls are presented in Table 1. Worker controls include dummies for gender, education level, 
caste, age group and religion. Standard errors are bootstrapped and clustered at the district level. ***, ** 
and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. 
2004-05                              
2007-08
Log Casual Wages
(ߙଶ)
(ߙଵ)
(ߙଵ)
(ߙଶ)
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Table 8: Program eﬀect on time allocation of urban workers
WHOLE DATA
Sample -0.399* -0.326* -0.0343 0.0218 -0.222 -0.119 0.287 0.213
(0.226) (0.193) (0.215) (0.231) (0.351) (0.332) (0.345) (0.305)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Observations 278 278 36 36 33 33 28 28
Functionary Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
District Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
TRIMMED 5%
Sample -0.434* -0.362* 0.0658 0.00587 -0.471* -0.428 -0.0891 -0.750*
(0.214) (0.193) (0.193) (0.216) (0.268) (0.304) (0.263) (0.380)
Observations 269 269 32 32 27 27 25 25
Functionary Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
District Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
DDC only 2011-12 DDC only 2012-13 DDC only 2013-14
DDC only 2013-14DDC only 2011-12 DDC only 2012-13All 2012-13
All 2012-13
Declarations 2011-12 were made from January 2011 to June 2012, declarations 2012-13 from August 
2012 to June 2013 and declarations 2013-14 from July 2013 to September 2014. The intervention period 
was September 2012 to April 2013. "District Development Committee" or DDC are in charge of rural 
development programs, including MGNREGS, in each district. Functionary Controls include the age, the 
square of age, and dummies for gender and designation of the functionaries as well as a dummy for 
whether the functionary is posted in the district she was born in. District Controls include the log of 
spending on labor costs, the log of spending material under the MGNREGS in the financial year 2011-12 
(according to the official website nrega.nic.in), as well as the log of the rural population (according to the 
2011 census).
Log Total Assets Declared by District-Level Functionaries
Log Total Assets Declared by District-Level Functionaries
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Table A.1: Cross-state comparison of NREGA work and migration (RICE Survey, all adults)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: All village pairs
Rajasthan -0.133 -0.961** -1.445 -1.111 -0.0160 -0.0115
(0.182) (0.473) (1.784) (1.707) (0.0241) (0.0210)
Summer (March-July) 6.399*** 5.951*** 12.93*** 13.36*** 0.181*** 0.188***
(0.872) (0.807) (1.742) (1.762) (0.0206) (0.0212)
Rajasthan x Summer 8.618*** 9.021*** -5.590** -5.566** -0.0700** -0.0718***
(1.163) (1.135) (2.212) (2.221) (0.0268) (0.0271)
Observations 6,957 6,579 6,957 6,579 6,957 6,579
Mean in MP and GJ from July to March 0.69 0.69 11.67 11.67 0.21 0.21
Worker Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Village Pair Fixed Effect No Yes No Yes No Yes
Panel B: Excluding GJ-RJ Pairs
Rajasthan -0.242 -0.342 -1.070 -1.253 -0.00860 -0.0210
(0.219) (0.468) (1.825) (1.656) (0.0260) (0.0221)
Summer (March-July) 7.958*** 7.568*** 16.83*** 17.35*** 0.226*** 0.235***
(1.002) (0.906) (1.890) (1.928) (0.0220) (0.0228)
Rajasthan x Summer 7.189*** 7.446*** -8.301*** -8.748*** -0.101*** -0.110***
(1.363) (1.293) (2.538) (2.586) (0.0295) (0.0303)
Observations 4,938 4,668 4,938 4,668 4,938 4,668
Mean in MP from July to March .86 .86 9.49 9.49 .18 .18
Worker Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Village Pair Fixed Effect No Yes No Yes No Yes
NREGA Days Days away Any migration trip
The unit of observation is an adult in a given season. The sample includes adults which were not interviewed 
personally but for whom NREGA work and migration days have been reported by the household head. Results in 
Panel B are based on pairs of villages in Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan only. Column One and Two presents results 
from a regression of days spent working on the NREGA during a particular season on a set of explanatory variables. 
In Column Three and Four the outcome is the number of days spent away for work. In Column Five and Six the 
outcome is a binary variable equal to one if the adult spent some time away for work during a particular season. 
Rajasthan is a dummy for whether the adult lives within a village in Rajasthan. Summer is a dummy for the summer 
months (mid-March to mid-July) Standard errors are computed assuming correlation of errors within villages. All 
regressions include a constant. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. 
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Table A.2: Cross-state comparison of permanent migration in the last ﬁve years (RICE
Survey)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PANEL A: All village pairs
Rajasthan 0.0447 0.0432 -0.0288 -0.197
(0.0388) (0.0327) (0.185) (0.173)
Observations 702 702 702 702
Mean in MP .39 .39 1.23 1.23
Worker Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Village Pair Fixed Effect No Yes No Yes
PANEL B: Excluding GJ-RJ Pairs
Rajasthan 0.0501 0.0414 0.112 -0.00927
(0.0472) (0.0371) (0.215) (0.186)
Observations 503 503 503 503
Mean in MP .4 .4 1.24 1.24
Worker Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Village Pair Fixed Effect No Yes No Yes
The unit of observation is a household  Results in Panel B are based on pairs of 
villages in Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan only. In Column One and Two the 
dependent variable a a dummy which equals one if any member of the household 
left within the past five years. In Column Three and Four the Rajasthan it is the 
number of household members who left within the past five years.  Standard 
errors are computed assuming correlation of errors within villages. All regressions 
include a constant. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent 
level.
Any Permanent Migrant Number of Migrants
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Table A.3: Predictions of rural to urban short-term Migration ﬂows
Migrants Any Migrant Log Migrants Migrants
OLS Probit OLS Poisson
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Distance -10.36* -0.127** -1.230*** -0.469***
(5.863) (0.0540) (0.135) (0.135)
Log Destination Casual Deflated Wage 15.52*** 0.0389 0.568*** 0.315**
(4.914) (0.0512) (0.121) (0.150)
Log Origination Casual Deflated Wage -14.05** -0.0212 -1.046*** -1.063***
(5.871) (0.0685) (0.178) (0.261)
No Casual Worker at Destination 93.54*** 0.0555 2.855*** 1.656**
(25.12) (0.205) (0.492) (0.668)
Log Destination Population 36.25*** 0.103*** 0.874*** 1.055***
(7.157) (0.0171) (0.0442) (0.0943)
Log Origin Population 29.31*** 0.438*** 1.295*** 0.939***
(6.371) (0.0327) (0.0748) (0.120)
Language Proximity 46.47** 0.652*** 1.715*** 1.788***
(18.65) (0.147) (0.306) (0.467)
Same State 104.6** -0.0325 1.593*** 0.656*
(41.93) (0.136) (0.313) (0.359)
Same District 1,840*** -1.026*** -2.957*** 0.0459
(208.2) (0.305) (0.801) (0.733)
Observations 247,506 247,506 147,794 247,506
R-Squared 0.046 0.442
Each col+B8:F40umn presents the results of a separate regression.  The unit of observation is a 
pair of one rural and one urban district. The outcome in Column 1 and 4 is the number of migrants 
going from rural to urban districts. The outcome in Column 2 is a binary variable for whether there 
is any migrant. The outcomes in Column 3 is the log of the number of migrants. All estimates are 
computed without sampling weights. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for correlation of 
the errors between state pairs. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels. 
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Table A.4: Predicted short-term migration inﬂows from rural areas as share of urban casual
labor force
STATE
Predicted Migration 
rate from early 
districts of star 
states
Predicted Migration 
rate from other 
rural districts          
.      
Star State?
(1) (2) (4)
Andhra Pradesh 22% 15% Yes
Assam 4% 28% No
Bihar 8% 54% No
Chhattisgarh 17% 28% Yes
Delhi 50% 221% No
Gujarat 6% 40% No
Haryana 16% 73% No
Himachal Pradesh 4% 14% Yes
Jharkhand 7% 36% No
Karnataka 4% 26% No
Kerala 2% 14% No
Madhya Pradesh 16% 33% Yes
Maharashtra 7% 46% No
Orissa 3% 27% No
Punjab 12% 67% No
Rajasthan 15% 53% Yes
Tamil Nadu 10% 22% Yes
Uttar Pradesh 13% 80% No
Uttaranchal 25% 90% Yes
West Bengal 3% 49% No
All 20 states 10% 41%
Column One present the ratio between the number of rural migrants from early districts of 
star states doing short-term trips to urban parts of a given state and the number of casual 
workers living in urban areas of that state. Column Two presents the ratio between the 
number of rural migrants from other rural districts doing short-term trips to urban parts of a 
given state and the estimated number of casual workers living in urban areas of that state. 
The number of casual workers is estimated using usual principal and subsidiary status of 
urban prime age adults in NSS 2004-05. Rural to urban migration flows are predicted using 
the gravity model presented in Table A3.
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Table A.5: Program eﬀect on urban casual wages controlling for time trends speciﬁc to states
and districts with high NREGA employment
Log Salaried 
Wage
1999-00   
2004-05
2007-08   
2011-12
2004-05                              
2007-08
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Migration rate from early 
districts of star states 0.783*** 0.565** -0.177 0.0419 0.126
(0.230) (0.251) (0.298) (0.243) (0.294)
Migration rate from other 
districts -0.155** -0.106* 0.0218 -0.0868 -0.0422
(0.0641) (0.0566) (0.0754) (0.0660) (0.0604)
Early District 0.126* 0.0389 -0.0737 -0.0844* 0.0720*
(0.0672) (0.0439) (0.0468) (0.0460) (0.0405)
Star State 0.100 0.101* -0.0799 -0.0540 0.0747
(0.0690) (0.0539) (0.0485) (0.0599) (0.0554)
Early X Star State -0.250** -0.185*** 0.0941 0.106 -0.0558
(0.0972) (0.0675) (0.0752) (0.0840) (0.0795)
Observations 14,815 14,815 20,388 12,654 12,654
District Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Worker Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
2004-05                              
2007-08
        is the ratio of the predicted number of rural migrants from early districts of star states on the number 
of urban residents who do casual work.          is the ratio of the predicted number of migrants from other 
rural districts on the number of residents who do casual work. In column 1, 2 and 4 the sample is 
composed of urban adults surveyed in NSS from July 2004 to June 2005 and July 2007 to March 2008. 
In column 3 the sample is composed of urban adults surveyed in NSS from July 2007 to March 2008 and 
July 2011 to June 2012. Each column presents results from a separate regression. In columns 1 to 3, the 
outcome is log deflated casual earnings. In column 4 the outcome is log deflated salaried earnings. Early 
District is a dummy variable equal to one for districts in which NREGA is implemented in 2007-08. Star 
state is a dummy variable equal to one for Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Madhya 
Pradesh, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu and Uttarkhand.District Controls are presented in Table 1. Worker 
controls include dummies for gender, education level, caste, age group and religion. Standard errors are 
clustered at the district level. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. 
Log Casual Wages
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Table A.6: Program eﬀect on urban employment controlling for time trends speciﬁc to states
and districts with high NREGA employment
Casual Labor Salaried Work Self-Employment Unemployed
Not in Labor 
Force
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Migration rate from early 
districts of star states -3.183 11.45 -10.86* -2.476 4.887
(4.256) (9.737) (6.543) (2.741) (6.820)
Migration rate from other 
districts 1.447 -4.134* 3.568** 0.441 -1.453
(0.982) (2.138) (1.430) (0.666) (1.568)
Early District -1.117* 1.567* -1.388 0.430 0.564
(0.652) (0.890) (0.876) (0.503) (0.863)
Star State 1.417 -2.490* -0.421 1.189* 0.312
(1.100) (1.306) (1.439) (0.609) (1.517)
Early X Star State 0.770 -2.070 2.277 -0.203 -0.958
(1.266) (1.980) (1.821) (0.859) (1.849)
Observations 193,578 193,578 193,578 193,578 193,578
District Controls No No No No No
Worker Controls No No No No No
Casual Labor Salaried Work Self-Employment Unemployed
Not in Labor 
Force
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Migration rate from early 
districts of star states 6.761* 8.706 -27.08*** -5.372 17.57***
(3.927) (6.068) (7.066) (3.317) (6.080)
Migration rate from other 
districts -0.955 -1.302 3.319* 0.727 -2.002
(0.925) (1.551) (1.752) (0.745) (1.576)
Early District -0.645 1.981* -2.563** 0.178 1.780*
(0.668) (1.012) (1.172) (0.603) (1.045)
Star State 0.860 -2.468* 1.988 1.116* -1.564
(0.938) (1.285) (1.341) (0.652) (1.429)
Early X Star State -0.564 -1.165 4.547** 0.179 -3.753**
(1.189) (1.660) (1.779) (0.916) (1.647)
Observations 193,578 193,578 193,578 193,578 193,578
District Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Worker Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
         is the ratio of the predicted number of rural migrants from early districts of star states on the number of 
urban residents who do casual work.        is the ratio of the predicted number of migrants from other rural districts 
on the number of residents who do casual work. The sample is composed of urban adults surveyed in NSS from 
July 2004 to June 2005 and July 2007 to March 2008. Each column presents results from a separate regression. 
The outcome is the fraction of total time spent in each activity. Early districts are those selected for the first and 
second phase of NREGA implementation. Star states are Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, 
Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu and Uttarkhand. District Controls are presented in Table 1. Worker 
controls include dummies for gender, education level, caste, age group and religion. Standard errors are clustered 
at the district level. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. 
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